Search results

When there is freedom of press, newspapers provide prying eyes that investigate and report the malfeasance by public officials. More prying eyes together with more newspaper readership make monitoring of public officials by the public easier and cheaper. This paper aims to investigate the role of newspapers in helping the public observe the conduct of local officials fearful of discovery of malfeasance by the newspaper readers in the USA during 1978 – 2008 when the internet was still a fledgling source of news.

A model that recognize that corruption is an agency problem that thrives in the absence of monitoring of public officials is used. The estimation technique used address problems issuing from the subjective nature of measures of press freedom and perception of corruption, and the persistence of corruption over time.

More newspapers and newspaper readers help to alleviate the agency problem that underlies public corruption in the USA and elsewhere. More newspapers (i.e. more journalists) act to deter corruption at the margin, and, ceteris paribus, higher readership works on exposing corrupt acts and helps to convict the errant officials in larger numbers.

The paper provides a timely context to consider the implication of sharp fall in local newspapers as well as newspaper readership all across the USA.

This paper extends the literature by considering press freedom, the number of newspapers and size of newspaper readership as joint determinants of public corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) home country corruption in their decision to bribe officials in foreign host countries.

A model that predicts MNE bribing by controlling for a multitude of foreign host country factors is used. The information contained in the orthogonal residuals from this model is exploited to see whether MNE’s home country factors, particularly the level of public corruption, work to amplify illegal behavior by respective MNE in abroad.

MNEs pay more in bribes when the foreign officials they face are more corrupt. This behavior worsens when MNE’s home country has more corruption.

All UN member countries are signatories to the UN Convention against Corruption that proscribes the bribing of foreign public officials by respective MNEs. The Convention’s reliance on home country enforcement of stipulations against the bribing of foreign officials by respective MNEs exposes its efficacy of the malfeasance of home country public officials.

This paper extends the literature to an examination of MNE’s use of bribes in a world with a global anti-corruption regime. Additionally, it ties MNE behavior in foreign countries to corruption in MNE’s home country.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between underwriter reputation and initial public offerings (IPOs) initial returns over a 24‐year period, from 1980 to 2003.

Two‐stage least‐squares regression analysis on data from IPOs offered from 1980 to 2003 is used to determine how the choice of IPO underwriter is related to initial returns when considering reputation as an endogenous variable.

This study shows, consistent with prior literature, that underwriter reputation is statistically significantly negatively related to initial returns from 1980 to 1991 and statistically significantly positively related to initial returns from 1992 to 2003, when reputation is taken as an exogenous variable. When considering the choice of the reputation of underwriter as endogenous to characteristics of the firm, the reputation of an underwriter is significantly positively related to IPO initial returns for 1980 to 2003 and 1992 to 2003 and insignificantly related, for 1980 to 1991.

This study adds value to finance literature in that it extends the research on the relationship between IPO initial returns and underwriter reputation. It also furthers the existing research on IPO anomalies and notes characteristics in this field of financial markets that may be important to both issuers and investment banks.

Empirical research demonstrates that bribery has a detrimental impact on investment, economic growth, trade, and democratic governments. In response to rising bribery activity and the additional burdens placed on corporate officials by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 has reached an all-time high. Although many managers, financial officers, entrepreneurs, and auditors are aware of the FCPA's objectives and mandates, many do not do an adequate job of protecting their firms, employees, and/or clients from fines and prison sentences. The purposes of this paper are to (1) analyze and describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions, payments (bribes), and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and analyze the important provisions of the FCPA; (3) discuss vicarious liability or the liability of U.S. firms and others for the acts of third parties; and (4) make recommendations to help firms improve their compliance with the FCPA.